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Abstract
The CPT theorem of quantum field theory states that any rela-
tivistic (Lorentz-invariant) quantum field theory must also be invari-
ant under CPT, the composition of charge conjugation, parity reversal
and time reversal. This paper sketches a puzzle that seems to arise
when one puts the existence of this sort of theorem alongside a stan-
dard way of thinking about symmetries, according to which spacetime
symmetries (at any rate) are associated with features of the spacetime
structure. The puzzle is, roughly, that the existence of a CPT theo-
rem seems to show that it is not possible for a well-formulated theory
that does not make use of a preferred frame or foliation to make use
of a temporal orientation. Since a manifold with only a Lorentzian
metric can be temporally orientable—capable of admitting a tempo-
ral orientation—this seems to be an odd sort of necessary connection
between distinct existences. The paper then suggests a solution to the
puzzle: it is suggested that the CPT theorem arises because temporal
orientation is unlike other pieces of spacetime structure, in that one
cannot represent it by a tensor field.
To avoid irrelevant technical details, the discussion is carried out
in the setting of classical field theory, using a little-known classical
analog of the CPT theorem.
1 Introduction
A story has it that in the early sixties, Richard Feynman was asked to give an
evening talk to physics students at Caltech, explaining the basic idea of the
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CPT theorem: the celebrated result in quantum field theory that states that
any relativistic (i.e. Lorentz-invariant) quantum field theory must also be
invariant under CPT, the composition of charge conjugation, parity reversal
and time reversal. Feynman agreed to commit to doing this, commenting
that if one cannot explain something to second year Caltech undergraduates
then one does not understand it oneself. The story goes that Feynman spent
a month or two trying to plan the talk, and then, in despair, cancelled the
commitment.
Whether or not this story is true, its basic point is well taken: despite
the importance of the CPT theorem in particle physics, the result itself is
generally not well understood, even by those whose professional practice
regularly appeals to it. It is often referred to as a ‘remarkable result’. It seems
worthwhile trying to attain a point of view from which the CPT theorem is
not remarkable at all, but is, rather, precisely what one expects on elementary
grounds. That is the aim of the project of which the present paper is a part.
More precisely, one can identify two positive sources of puzzlement:
• How can it come about that one symmetry (e.g. Lorentz invariance)
entails another (e.g. CPT) at all?
• How can there be such an intimate relationship between spatiotempo-
ral symmetries (Lorentz invariance, parity reversal, time reversal) on
the one hand, and charge conjugation, not obviously a spatiotemporal
notion at all, on the other?
This paper focusses on the first sort of puzzlement. I first sharpen the
puzzle by suggesting that, according to a way of thinking about spacetime
symmetries that is (for good reason) fairly common currency in the phi-
losophy of physics community, there is a particular reason for thinking that
Lorentz covariance should not be able to entail anything like CPT covariance.
I then go on to offer a solution to the puzzle.
An outline of the paper is as follows.
Section 2 reviews the standard way of thinking about spacetime symme-
tries, well discussed by (in particular) Michael Friedman (1983) and John
Earman (1989), that will give rise to the sharpened form of our puzzle and
that will provide the framework for our discussion. The key point to be
taken from this section, for the purposes of this paper, is that one generally
expects to find a certain correspondence between the dynamical symmetries
of a given spacetime theory, on the one hand, and the spacetime structure
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postulated by that theory, on the other. More precisely, we expect the follow-
ing principle to hold: that the covariance group of a theory (when formulated
non-generally-covariantly) should, for a well-formulated theory, be equal to
the invariance group of the set of geometrical objects that are not represented
explicitly in the coordinate-dependent, non-generally-covariant formulation
in question. (Readers familiar with the standard framework in question can
easily skip or skim this section.)
Section 3 suggests that, from this point of view, the existence of a CPT
theorem is prima facie puzzling. The idea here will be that a CPT theorem
seems to be telling us that it is not possible for a relativistic theory (that
is, on our way of thinking, a theory that does not require the existence of
a preferred frame or foliation) to make essential use of a temporal orienta-
tion.1 Since a manifold with only a Lorentzian metric can be temporally
orientable—capable of admitting a temporal orientation—this seems to be
an odd sort of necessary connection between distinct existences; and, since
there is no obstacle to theories’ making essential use of other pieces of space-
time structure, such as a metric or a total orientation, we require an account
of what makes temporal orientation special.
To anchor our discussion and to enable us to carry out its remainder
in the simpler context of classical, rather than quantum, field theory, sec-
tion 4 reviews a ‘classical PT theorem’ (originally stated by (Bell, 1955)),
and discusses ways of formulating Lorentz-invariant, PT-violating theories
by violating one or more of the auxiliary constraints required for that the-
orem. This discussion shows that (as we would expect) Lorentz-invariant,
PT-violating theories are not ruled out as a matter of logical or mathemati-
cal consistency. However, at this stage we will still have a puzzle about how
and why the auxiliary constraints suffice for the result.
Section 5 offers a solution to the puzzle: the key point is that temporal
orientation is indeed (in a Lorentzian context) unlike many other pieces of
spacetime structure, in that it cannot be represented by a Lorentz-invariant
tensor field. Meanwhile, the ‘auxiliary constraints’ that we expect any ‘rea-
sonable’ field theory to satisfy have the effect that pieces of spacetime struc-
ture that can be represented by such tensor fields can easily be made use
of in the theory, but those that cannot be so represented generally (and
emphperhaps universally) cannot be made use of.
1The discussion of this paper applies just as much to spatial orientation as to temporal
orientation. We discuss the latter case for definiteness.
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Section 6 considers the puzzle and its suggested resolution in the context
of Galilean- (rather than Lorentz-) invariant field theories. The point here
is that while we do have a ‘Lorentzian CPT theorem’—a theorem stating
that any Lorentz -invariant field theory must also be CPT invariant—we do
not have a ‘Galilean CPT theorem’ (and there do exist Galilean-invariant,
CPT-non-invariant theories). We can therefore perform a ‘sanity check’ on
the discussion of this paper, by checking that the suggested explanation of
how anything like a CPT theorem can come about in the Lorentzian case
does not also suggest that we should expect to find a CPT theorem in the
Galilean case. The result will be reassuring: there is a Galilean-invariant
tensor field representing temporal orientation, and, indeed, by making use of
the field in question we can easily construct examples of Galilean-invariant,
non-CPT-invariant field theories.
Section 7 is the conclusion.
2 The connection between dynamical sym-
metries and spacetime structure
This section reviews a standard way of thinking about spacetime symmetries.
This standard account provides the framework within which the existence of
the CPT theorem is, I will suggest, prima facie puzzling. The review in this
section is very much in the spirit of the discussions given by Friedman (1983,
chapters 2 and 3) and Earman (1989, chapters 2 and 3). It may be skipped
or skimmed by those familiar with the framework in question. (The only
slightly idiosyncratic elements are the talk of ‘special’ rather than ‘absolute’
or ‘kinematical’ objects, and (relatedly) the terminology ‘covarianceQ group
of a theory’; I indulge in this idiosyncrasy to avoid irrelevant complications
concerning how, if at all, one might define ‘absolute’ or ‘kinematical’; cf.
footnote 3.)
Spacetime theories. Let T be a spacetime theory. That is, T is a theory
whose intended models are structures of the form 〈M,Φ1, . . . ,Φn〉, where M
is a differentiable manifold, and the Φi are geometrical objects on M .
Let us suppose that these structures ‘explicitly represent all the structure
that is presupposed by the theory’. On the intuitive level, this is supposed to
require that, for any piece of spacetime structure, other than the topological
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and differential structure, that the theory requires, there is a field Φ repre-
senting that structure. (Topological and differential structure are exempted
only because they are already given with the manifold (as opposed to: the
point set) M .) For example, if the theory is supposed to be set in Minkowski
spacetime, then one of the Φi’s will be the Minkowski metric g. (We will
formalize this condition below.)
Proto-symmetries. To discuss the symmetries of a theory T , we need first
to regard the set MD of models of the theory (D for ‘dynamically allowed’) as
a subset, MD ⊂MK , of a larger set MK of ‘kinematically allowed structures’.
We then consider maps from the set MK into itself; let us say that such a
map is a proto-symmetry of the theory T iff the map leaves the dynamically
allowed subset MD invariant.
‘Proto-symmetries’ in this sense are very easy to come by: any theory
with N models has as many distinct proto-symmetries as there are bijections
from an N -element set onto itself. Most proto-symmetries, of course, will be
uninteresting; we will be interested only in those that are ‘generated’ in some
particularly simple way.
Groups and group actions. A group is a pair (G, ·), where G is a set
and · is a binary relation on G satisfying certain formal conditions.2 A group
may be abstract (i.e., G may be a set of ‘bare points’ having no features other
than their the relation ·), or concrete (as, for example, if the elements of G
are transformations of some spacetime manifold, and the · operation is that
of composition of maps).
An action of a group (G, ·) on a set S is a map A : G→ Perm(S)—that is,
a map assigning to each element of G a permutation of S—with the feature
that for all g1, g2 ∈ G,A(g1)A(g2) = A(g1 · g2).
Symmetries. We wish formally to capture the sense in which particular
groups of spacetime transformations—for example, the Lorentz or Galilei
groups—may or may not ‘be symmetries’ of a given spacetime theory T .
2Namely: for all g1, g2 ∈ G, g1 ·g2 ∈ G also (closure); for all g1, g2, g3 ∈ G, g1 · (g2 ·g3) =
(g1 · g2) · g3 (associativity); there exists e ∈ G such that for all g ∈ G, g · e = e · g = g
(existence of identity); for all g ∈ G, there exists g−1 ∈ G such that g · g−1 = g−1 · g = e
(existence of inverses).
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Neither abstract nor concrete groups are themselves maps from MK onto
itself, so are not proto-symmetries. Instead, we will say that such a group
G is a symmetry group of the theory T relative to action A of G on MK iff
∀g ∈ G, (A(g)) (MD) = MD. (There will often be some ‘natural’ action of
G on MK that is understood in the context, in which case we will suppress
explicit statement of the intended relativization to that action, for the sake
of brevity.
To go further, we need to specialise to the case of our theories of interest,
and describe the ‘natural’ group actions that we intend to discuss for these
particular theories.
Our particular interest is in spacetime symmetries. For any manifold M ,
we have the (concrete) group Diff(M) of diffeomorphisms of M . We first
note that, for any geometrical object Φ on a manifold M , there is a natural
action of the diffeomorphism group Diff(M) on Φ: for example, if Φi is a
vector field on M , the natural action of h takes Φi to its push-forward h∗Φi,
while if Φi is a one-form then the natural action is the pull-back to h
∗Φi.
(We will write h ∗Φj for the result of allowing h to act in the natural way on
Φj, where the tensor nature of Φj is left unspecified. In the general case, the
specification of this ‘natural’ action of the diffeomorphism group on Φj may
be taken as part of the ‘definition’ of Φj. Thus, for example, true tensors
and so-called ‘pseudo-tensors’ are regarded as distinct types of geometrical
object.)
We require an action of Diff(M), not on individual geometric objects
Φi, but on structures 〈M,Φ1, . . . ,Φn〉. Here we must proceed with some
caution, because the most obvious way of having an action on the Φis induce
an action on structures turns out not to be the one of current interest. That
‘most obvious’ way is to allow the diffeomorphism h to act in the natural
way on each of the geometrical objects in an arbitrary structure m ∈ MK :
that is, to consider the action A : Diff(M)→ Perm(Mk) given by
∀h ∈ Diff(M), A(h) (〈M,Φ1, . . . ,Φn〉) = 〈M,h ∗ Φ1, . . . , h ∗ Φn〉. (1)
However, relative to this action A, if (as we are supposing) ‘all the structure
presupposed by the theory’ is encoded in the Φis, every h will be a symmetry
of our theory T . (The condition that MD be ‘diffeomorphism-invariant’ in
this sense is the promised formal expression of our assumption that the struc-
tures in question ‘explicitly represent all the structure that is presupposed
by the theory’.)
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This sense of diffeomorphism-invariance is not our present interest, since
we want to capture the special relationship of, say, the Poincare´ group to rel-
ativistic electromagnetic theory, and the Galilei group to Newtonian gravita-
tion theory. (One normally wants to say that Newtonian gravitation theory
is Galilean-covariant and that Maxwell’s equations are not, or that a theory
counts as special relativistic just in case it is Poincare´-covariant; we seem to
be losing an interesting and fruitful distinction if we have only the sense in
which all theories that ‘explicitly represent all the structure they presuppose’
are diffeomorphism invariant.) To do this, we must find a different action of
Diff(M) on MK , relative to which only some proper subgroup of Diff(M) is
a symmetry group of the theory.
The action we want is as follows. For a given theory T , we single out some
subset Q of the geometrical objects Φi as ‘special’.
3 Having chosen our set Q,
we then write candidate models of T in the form 〈M,S1, . . . , Sm, O1, . . . , On〉,
where the Si (‘special’ objects) are elements of Q and the Oi (‘ordinary’
objects) are not. We now allow the diffeomorphism h to act only on the
‘ordinary’ objects Oi /∈ Q. That is, we consider the action AQ : Diff(M) →
Perm(MK) given by
∀h ∈ Diff(M), AQ(h) (〈M,S1, . . . , Sm, O1, . . . , On〉) = 〈M,S1, . . . , Sm, h∗O1, . . . , h∗On〉.
(2)
We define the covarianceQ group of T to be the set of h ∈ Diff(M) such that
h is a symmetry of T relative to the action AQ.
The connection between symmetries and spacetime structure. The
covarianceQ group of a spacetime theory will, in general, be some proper sub-
group of Diff(M). But more can be said. Define the invariance group of a set
Q of geometrical objects as the group of diffeomorphisms h ∈ Diff(M) such
that (the natural action of) h leaves each element of Q invariant. Suppose
it is the case that, for each model of our theory T , the invariance group of
3One way to go about branding objects ‘special’ is to look for some formal criterion
that will pick some of them out, such as the Anderson-Friedman ‘absoluteness’ criterion
(see, e.g., Friedman (1983, pp. 56-61). Another is to say that the ‘special’ ones are the
‘kinematical’ or ‘geometrical’ ones, and hope that we know what this means. An approach
that is less ambitious, but that suffices for our present purposes—and that, therefore, we
follow here—is to do without any such general criterion, and simply to specify some subset
of the objects in a given theory on a case-by-case basis, putting a subscript on ‘covariance’
to indicate which set of objects we have chosen to treat as ‘special’.
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the set (S1, . . . , Sm) of ‘special’ fields appearing in that model is the same.
In this case, we can regard the invariance group of Q as a property of the
theory, rather than of a particular model of the theory. We then expect that,
if our theory T is ‘well-formulated’, the covarianceQ group of T is equal to
the invariance group of Q.
To support this expectation, we argue first that the invariance group of Q
is a subgroup of the covarianceQ group of T , and then that the covarianceQ
group of T is a subgroup of the invariance group of Q. (Similar arguments
are given in Earman (ibid., pp.46-7).)
The first claim—that the invariance group of Q is a subgroup of the
covarianceQ group of T—follows trivially from the sense in which T is diffeomorphism-
invariant. (Since
〈M,S1, . . . , Sm, O1, . . . , On〉 ∈MD
⇒ 〈M,h ∗ S1, . . . , h ∗ Sm, h ∗O1, . . . , h ∗On〉 ∈MD,
if in addition we have h ∗ Si = Si for i = 1, . . . ,m, it follows trivially that
〈M,S1, . . . , Sm, O1, . . . , On〉 ∈MD
⇒ 〈M,S1, . . . , Sm, h ∗O1, . . . , h ∗On〉 ∈MD;
that is, that AQ(h) takes models to models.)
The second claim—that the covarianceQ group of T is a subgroup of the
invariance group of Q—can arguably be defended, for suitable selections of
the set Q, by an appeal to Ockham’s Razor. Here it is important that the
(‘special’) objects in Q are not themselves ‘directly observable’ or ‘given to
us by a mechanical experiment’: that their existence is, rather, inferred from
empirical data that more directly gives us the ‘ordinary’ objects Oi. The
basic idea is that, if we have a theory and a set Q of ‘special’ objects such
that the invariance group of Q is a proper subset of the covarianceQ group
of T , then it ought to be possible to write down an alternative theory T ′
that has the same empirical consequences as does T as far as the Oi are
concerned, but that replaces Q with a set Q′ whose invariance group is larger
than that of Q; further, that this alternative theory T ′ is more parsimonious
than T . The claim then is that, if T is a ‘well-formulated’ theory (i.e. if T
respects Ockham’s Razor), the invariance group of Q will be a subgroup of
the covarianceQ group of T .
4
4In theories that ‘have no absolute objects’, such as general relativity (GR), the natural
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Non-generally covariant formulations of spacetime theories. While
it is often preferable, for the purposes of foundational discussions, to for-
mulate theories in a coordinate-free framework, such a framework is often
inconvenient for calculations, and is used in only a minority of the physics
literature. It will therefore be useful to see how the abstract considerations
above relate to coordinate-dependent formulations of theories. For simplic-
ity, we will restrict our attention to spacetimes that are diffeomorphically R4
(i.e. for which there exists a global coordinate chart).
When formulating one’s theory in a coordinate-dependent way, one faces
a choice between two options. (The distinction between the two is analogous
to the distinction between the two actions A and AQ given above.
The first option is explicitly to take coordinate components of all the
geometrical objects that appear in the coordinate-independent formulation.
If one takes this first option, one arrives at a set of coordinate-dependent
equations that picks out the intended class of models relative to an arbitrary
coordinate system. Say that the covariance group of the theory is the group
of transformations between those coordinate systems relative to which the
given set of equations picks out the intended class of models; we thus have,
in this first case, Diff(M) as the covariance group.
The second, alternative, option is to represent some chosen subset Q
of one’s geometrical objects implicitly : that is, to consider its coordinate
components as functions of the coordinates, and to ‘transform’ them, when
changing to any other coordinate system, by keeping the same function of
the coordinates in the new frame. If one takes this second option, one arrives
at a coordinate-dependent formulation that picks out the intended class of
models only relative to a certain ‘privileged’ class of coordinate systems (the
‘privileged’ class being the class of coordinate systems in which the coordinate
components of the implicit geometrical objects happen to be the same as their
move is to take the set Q of ‘special’ objects to be the null set, in which case it is vacuously
true that the invariance group of Q is Diff(M); that the covarianceQ group of the theory
is then also Diff(M) follows from the ‘cheap’ sense in which T is diffeomorphism-invariant.
In this sense, the present account is consistent with the received wisdom that there is a
non-trivial sense in which GR (but not SR) is diffeomorphism-invariant: GR (but not SR)
is diffeomorphism-covariantQ for the choice of Q that is ‘most natural’ given the theory.
However, one can then ask in virtue of what it is ‘natural’ to take Q to be null in such
theories. The project of answering this question is of a piece with the (post-Friedman)
project of supplying a criterion of ‘absoluteness’ according to which general relativity has
no absolute objects, which, as noted above (footnote 3), lies outside the scope of this
paper.
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components in the original, defining, coordinate system). The covariance
group of this set of equations will then, in general, be some proper subgroup
of Diff(M), and again we expect that the covariance group will be equal to
the invariance group of the set Q of objects that we chose to single out for
special treatment.
Example. We illustrate the above abstract discussion using the example of
special-relativistic electromagnetism. According to this theory, there is a flat
Lorentzian metric gab, a tensor field Fab (the electromagnetic field) of type
(0, 2), and a vector field Ja (the charge-current density field). The equations
relating these objects are
F ab;b = −4piJa, (3)
F[ab;c] = 0, (4)
where indices are raised using the inverse gab of the metric, and it is under-
stood that the covariant derivative is the unique one that is compatible with
the metric. These equations are generally covariant, in the following two
(equivalent) senses:
Coordinate-independent sense of general covariance. If 〈M, gab, Fab, Ja〉
satisfies (3) and (4), then so does 〈M,h ∗ gab, h ∗Fab, h ∗Ja〉,
for any manifold diffeomorphism h : M →M .
Coordinate-dependent sense of general covariance. In co-
ordinate component form, the equations (3)–(4) become
Fµν;ν ≡ ∂Fµν
∂xν
− ΓλµνFλν − ΓλννFµλ (5)
= Jµ; (6)
F[µν;σ] ≡ 1
3
(
∂Fµν
∂xσ
− ΓλµσFλν − ΓλνσFµλ (7)
+
∂Fνσ
∂xµ
− ΓλνµFλσ − ΓλσµFνλ (8)
+
∂Fσµ
∂xν
− ΓλσνFλµ − ΓλµνFσλ) (9)
= 0. (10)
These equations pick out the same (i.e. the intended) class
of models in any coordinate system x : M → R4.
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However, we can also identify a clear sense in which ‘the symmetry group
of classical electromagnetism’ is the Poincare´ group, rather than the full
diffeomorphism group:
Coordinate-independent sense of special covariance. Let us single out
the metric g as ‘special’. Then, we consider the action A{g} : Diff(M)→
Perm(MK), given by
∀h ∈ Diff(M), Ag(h) (〈M, gab, Fab, Ja〉) = 〈M, gab, h∗Fab, h∗Ja〉. (11)
For arbitrary h, we will not in general expect this transformation to take
models to models. In general we will (instead) expect h-covarianceg
only when h happens to leave g invariant, since, in that case but in that
case alone, the RHS of (11) is identical to 〈M,h ∗ gab, h ∗ Fab, h ∗ Ja〉.
So now we have a nontrivial covarianceg group, and it is precisely the
group of transformations leaving the ‘special’ object g invariant: that
is, the Poincare´ group.
Coordinate-dependent sense of special covariance. If we choose a co-
ordinate system in which the Christoffel symbols vanish (that is, an
inertial coordinate system), then, the equations (5)–(10) reduce, re-
spectively, to
∂Fµν
∂xν
= Jµ; (12)
∂Fµν
∂xσ
+
∂Fνσ
∂xµ
+
∂Fσµ
∂xν
= 0. (13)
(Noting that
F =

0 E1 E2 E3
−E1 0 −B3 B2
−E2 B3 0 −B1
−E3 −B2 B1 0
 , (14)
it is straightforward to see that these coincide with usual coordinate-
dependent form of the Maxwell equations.)
We have gained notational simplicity, relative to (5)–(10), but now
we must remember that our equations (12)–(13) pick out the intended
class of models only relative to a privileged class of coordinate systems,
which latter are related to one another by Poincare´ transformations.
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This concludes our review of the standard material within which our
puzzle will appear. The key point of this section, for our purposes, is the
following: there is an intimate relationship between the spacetime symmetries
of a theory, on the one hand, and the spacetime structure postulated by that
theory, on the other. Specifically, a ‘well-formulated’ theory fails to have a
particular manifold diffeomorphism as one of its symmetries iff it postulates
some piece of background (that is, ‘special’) structure that is not invariant
under the diffeomorphism in question.
3 A puzzle about the CPT theorem.
We are now in a position to state our puzzle concerning the CPT theorem.
This theorem states that, subject to some apparently innocuous auxiliary
conditions, the following conditional must hold of any quantum field theory
T :
If T is invariant under the restricted Lorentz group L↑+, then T
is actually invariant under CPT.
I mentioned (in the introduction) that it is possible to decompose a gen-
eral sense of puzzlement at this statement into two parts: one concerning
how Lorentz invariance can entail another symmetry at all, and a second
concerning how charge conjugation gets into an otherwise spatiotemporal
picture. Since our present concern is with the first of these, let us ‘pretend’
(but justification for this move will be offered in the next section) that, in-
stead of the CPT theorem, we actually have a PT theorem. Then we have
(instead) the following statement:
If T is invariant under the restricted Lorentz group L↑+, then T
is actually invariant under the whole of the proper Lorentz group
L+ (i.e. under the total-reflection component, as well as under
the identity component).
In the light of the standard account of spacetime symmetries that we
reviewed in section 2, this conditional is prima facie rather puzzling. Here
is why. Suppose that we have a theory according to which there are, among
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other objects, a flat Lorentzian metric g, a total orientation  and a temporal
orientation τ .5
Then, first, we note the invariance groups of three sets of objects we might
choose to treat as ‘special’ in the sense of section 2:
Set Q of
special
fields
Invariance group of Q Sk
{g} L (full Lorentz group)
{g, } L+ (proper Lorentz group)
{g, , τ} L↑+ (restricted Lorentz group)
The restricted Lorentz group, L↑+, is the set of Lorentz (i.e. g-preserving)
transformations that can be continuously connected to the identity: it in-
cludes all rotations, boosts and products thereof, but does not include parity
or time reflection. The proper Lorentz group, L+, is the set of all metric-
preserving Lorentz transformations with determinant one, i.e. the union
of L↑+ with the set of all Lorentz transformations that reverse both spatial
parity and time sense. Finally, the full Lorentz group, L, includes all metric-
preserving transformations: those that reverse parity, time sense, both or
neither. (See figure 1.)
Ignoring the first of the possibilities listed in the above table (i.e. that of
treating g alone as ‘special’), we should then expect to be able to write down,
not only a non-generally covariant theory whose covariance group is exactly
L+ (by treating g and  as ‘special’), but also a non-generally covariant theory
whose invariance group is exactly L↑+ (by treating g,  and τ as ‘special’).
A PT theorem, however, tells us that we cannot do the latter: that, subject
to the (as yet unstated) auxiliary assumptions of our theorem, we cannot
find theories that are invariant under precisely the restricted Lorentz group.
It seems to be telling us, that is, that no theory that is ‘nice’ (in the sense
of conforming to these auxiliary assumptions) can actually make use of a
temporal orientation, over and above a flat metric and a total orientation.
5The total orientation is an object that determines, for any ordered quadruple consisting
of one timelike and three linearly independent spacelike 4-vectors, whether that quadruple
is ‘right-handed’ or ‘left-handed’. It can be represented by a totally antisymmetric rank
four tensor, abcd. The temporal orientation is an object that specifies in a continuous
way, at each point p, which is the ‘future’ lobe of the lightcone in TpM . Its possible
representations will be considered in section 5.
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L↑+ L↑-
L↓- L↓+
L+
L
Figure 1: The (real) Lorentz group has four mutually disconnected compo-
nents, labelled by ↑ or ↓ according to whether or not they reverse time sense,
and by + or − according to whether or not they reverse total orientation
(i.e. whether their determinant is +1 or −1). In this notation, L↑+ is the
‘restricted’ Lorentz group; L+ ≡ L↑+ ∪ L↓+ is the ‘proper’ Lorentz group;
L ≡ L↑+ ∪ L↑− ∪ L↓− ∪ L↓+ is the ‘full’ Lorentz group.
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And now one might well wonder why not. Metric, temporal orientation and
total orientation seem to be paradigm cases of distinct existences; it’s odd
to find such necessary connections between them. Or, to put the puzzle
another way: where does this discrimination against temporal orientations
come from? That is, what feature of temporal orientation can explain why,
in the context of the existing objects g and , they are unusable in this way?
This is not a paradox, but it does seem to be a puzzle whose resolution
is likely to be illuminating. In the next section, I give an explicit statement
of the theorem that is the source of our puzzle, and in section 5 I offer a
resolution.
4 A classical PT theorem
At the start of section 3, I promised some motivation for ‘changing the sub-
ject’ from CPT to PT.
The point here is the following. What we have, in the case of quantum
field theory, is a theorem (a mathematical statement) asserting the invariance
of a certain class of theories under a certain mathematically specified trans-
formation. (For example, the the case of the Dirac field, it is the operator
transformation
ψˆ(t,x) 7→ iγ5ψˆ(−t,−x).) (15)
We then give a name—usually ‘CPT’—to the transformation thus specified,
and then we call our theorem a ‘CPT theorem’.
Names need not be arbitrary, and the name ‘CPT’ is not assigned ar-
bitrarily in the present case: one finds, in quantum field theory textbooks,
arguments for the claim that these transformations are equal to the compo-
sition of three transformations that are appropriately called ‘charge conjuga-
tion’, ‘parity reversal’ and ‘time reversal’ respectively. (In our example, the
claim is that
ψˆ(t,x) 7→ γ1γ3ψˆ(−t,x) is appropriately called ‘time reversal’;
ψˆ(t,x) 7→ γ0ψˆ(t,−x) is appropriately called ‘parity reversal’;
ψˆ(t,x) 7→ −iγ2ψˆ∗(t,x) is appropriately called ‘charge conjugation’.)
However, these arguments do not amount to conclusive demonstrations
that these transformations, and these alone, deserve the given names. The
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arguments depend on certain assumptions, such as that time reversal should
take one-particle states to one-particle states, rather than to one-antiparticle
states (equivalently: that it should take particle creation operators to parti-
cle creation operators, not to antiparticle creation operators; cf. (Peskin &
Schroeder, 1995, p. 67)). Such assumptions may be very natural, but they
are not forced on us by the mathematics alone.
Naturalness (furthermore) is relative to point of view. Here, two points
of view are relevant: that a quantum field theory is an encoding of the
phenomenology of particle physics, and that a quantum field theory is a
quantization of a classical field theory. (Both are generally true, of course.)
Emphasizing the former does indeed render assumptions such as that cited
above very natural (time reversal, plausibly, should reverse the direction of
motion of a given type of entity, but should not change that entity into
something else). Emphasizing the latter, however, renders it more natural to
approach the task of naming transformations as follows: start from a classical
field theory, with assumptions about which classical transformations deserve
the names ‘time reversal’ and ‘parity reversal’ already in place (never mind
whence!); obtain a QFT by quantization; work out which transformations on
QFT states and operators are induced by the already-named transformations
on classical fields, and name the former accordingly. And the Bell/Feynman
point is that when one carries out this latter project, with standard names for
the classical transformations, the transformation that is usually called ‘TC’
receives the name ‘T’. (Hence Feynman’s oft-cited claim that ‘time reversal
turns particles into antiparticles’. The transformation usually called ‘time
reversal’, as we noted in passing above, does not; Feynman is to be under-
stood as advocating an alternative, and he thinks better motivated, naming
convention.) It follows, other things being held fixed, that the transformation
that is standardly called ‘CPT’ receives the name ‘PT’. In this sense, and this
sense alone, the so-called CPT theorem is ‘really’ a PT theorem.
(Question: Which approach names transformations in a way that is more
appropriate, from a fundamental point of view?—If this question is ‘which
would we expect to reveal the true connections between symmetries and back-
ground spacetime structure?’, the (perhaps disappointing) answer is ‘neither’.
Both particle phenomenology and classical field theory are less ontologically
fundamental than quantum field theory. Fundamentally, we would like to
take quantum field theory on its own terms, as a base from which particle
physics and classical field theory should each emerge as good approxima-
tions in certain, quantum-field-theoretically specifiable, domains, and work
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out just in terms of the fundamental ontology of QFT (i.e. particle physics
and classical field theory notwithstanding) which field transformations bear
special relationships to which spacetime symmetries. Perhaps unfortunately,
it is not clear how or whether this project can be carried out, since the ‘on-
tology’ (if such there be) of QFT is murky. If, however, our interest (as in the
present paper) is in importing our better understanding of the mathematics
of symmetries in classical field theory in order to understand the quantum-
theoretic CPT theorem, then, clearly, it is the second approach that is of
interest.)
In the present paper, we focus on a classical counterpart of the CPT
theorem; this classical counterpart is, in the terms of section 2, naturally
viewed as being a PT theorem. We do this because the classical case is simpler
(hence, strategically, a good starting point for enhancing understanding),
and we expect most features of our discussion of the classical PT theorem
to apply equally well to the quantum ‘CPT’ theorem. A close examination
of the quantum theorem itself, and of the relationship between the classical
and quantum theorems, lies outside the scope of this paper.
4.1 Bell’s theorem
The ‘classical PT’ result to be discussed is adapted from one given by John
S Bell, in the surprisingly-little known paper cited above.
In outline, the result is as follows. We consider a classical theory given
by a system of partial differential equations (PDEs) on a specified set of
spacetime-tensor fields. Let Φ be the space of kinematically allowed fields.
(In the general case, we may be dealing with a theory containing a number
of interacting fields—scalar fields, tensor fields, etc—so, for a given theory,
an element of Φ will be an ordered m-tuple of specified numbers of scalar
fields, vector fields, rank 2 tensor fields, etc.) We note that any PDE can
be expressed as the vanishing of some functional F : Φ → RM of the fields.
(That is, F encodes the dynamics in the sense that: φ ∈ Φ is dynamically
allowed iff F (φ) is the zero map on M .) Let A be the usual action of the
proper Lorentz group L+ ⊂ Diff(M) on Φ (that is, each l ∈ L+ acts on each
component Φi of Φ via the push-forward/pull-back/etc, accordingly as Φi is
a vector field/one-form/etc.) We assume that F is a local polynomial in the
fields and their spacetime derivatives. It can then be proved that, if the set S
of solutions of the equation F (φ) = 0 is invariant (relative to this action A)
under the restricted Lorentz group L↑+, then S is actually invariant (relative
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to A) under the tensor representation of the whole of the proper Lorentz
group L+ (i.e. including total reflections as well as rotations and boosts).
Summing this up, the claim is: Let T be a theory according to which
there are n dynamical fields Φ1, . . . ,Φn. Suppose that the following three
conditions hold:
1. The dynamical fields are tensors (of arbitrary rank).
2. The dynamical equations are partial differential equations that are local
polynomials in the fields and their spacetime derivatives.
3. The set S of solutions to the dynamical equations is invariant (relative
to the natural action) under L↑+.
Then, S is actually invariant (relative to the natural action) under all of
L+
(
≡ L↑+ ∪ PT (L↑+)
)
.
A more rigorous statement of the theorem behind this claim is given in
Appendix A. A proof is given in (Greaves, n.d.).
4.2 Auxiliary constraints
We were careful, in section 3, to state our puzzle as arising from the fact
that no ‘nice’ theory is invariant under precisely the restricted Lorentz group,
rather than that no theory whatsoever has just that invariance group. ‘Nice’,
here, means ‘conforming to the auxiliary assumptions of the PT theorem’
(i.e. the conditions (1) and (2) in section 4.1 above). It is worth highlighting,
then, the fact that these ‘auxiliary assumptions’ play a crucial role in both
the antecedent plausibility, and in the proof, of the PT theorem. There
obviously do exist ‘theories’, in the minimal sense of ‘classes of models’, that
are L↑+-invariant but not L+-invariant. (To generate one, we need only pick
some particular scalar field on 〈M, g〉 that does not have any interesting
symmetries, and take the set that results from closing under the action of
the restricted Lorentz group.)
That the assumptions in question are each essential can be seen as follows.
In the classical theorem sketched above, our principal auxiliary constraint
is a restriction on the dynamics: the dynamics must express the vanishing
of all members of some particular set of polynomials in the coordinate com-
ponents of the fields and their derivatives. There are two points here that
are worthy of note. The first is that some equations, fairly plausible from
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the point of view of physics, are not ‘polynomial’ in the required sense.6 It
may be possible to weaken the assumptions of the theorem, so as to cover
these cases also. The second point is that some ‘dynamics’ do not express
the vanishing of any mathematically simple functional F at all (polynomial
or otherwise). One example of this phenomenon is given by the ‘theory’
sketched in the opening paragraph of this subsection; another is given by the
theory ‘Inc’ stated below (see footnote 10).
It is also worth noting that the theorem claims invariance only under the
usual tensor representation of L+. Now, in the physics (as opposed to the
mathematics) literature, one talks of ‘how objects transform under PT’ as
part of the definition of those objects, rather than as part of the specification
of which transformations on the set of fields one is making a claim about.
In the physics-literature language, therefore, the restriction of our claim to
tensor representations amounts to a substantive assumption about ‘which
types of fields’ may be present in our theory: we are ruling out theories
‘containing dynamical fields that transform as pseudotensors under PT’. If
we are allowed PT-pseudotensors, then counterexamples to the claim of PT
invariance are easy to come by. Here is one: let φ be a pseudoscalar field,
and let the dynamical equation be
φ = 1. (16)
Under PT, a PT-pseudscalar φ transforms to −φ; hence, PT does not take
solutions of (16) to solutions.7 (In mathematics-literature language: the
equation is not invariant under ‘PT-pseudotensor’ representations of L+.)
Be this as it may, there still seems to be something prima facie puzzling
even about the restricted claim that all theories within the stated class obey
the conditional ‘if L↑+-invariant then L+-invariant’ (relative to representations
of L+ within the stated class)—there is no connection yet apparent between
the restrictions involved in the assumptions of the theorem on the one hand,
6For example, equations involving terms like sin(∇aφ∇aφ) or operators like
√∇2 +m2
are not ‘polynomial’. I am grateful to Robert Geroch and Michael Kiessling (resp.) for
pointing out these particular examples.
7Slightly less trivially, suppose that ψ is a scalar field and χ a pseudoscalar under PT
(i.e. χ e7−→ χ for e ∈ L↑+, but χ PT−→ −χ). Then, the equation
ψχ− ψ = 0 (17)
is L↑+-invariant but not PT-invariant.
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and the surprising ineffectiveness of temporal orientation on the other. This
is the puzzle we wish to solve.
5 Resolution of the puzzle
Let us take stock. We started (section 2) by sketching a way of thinking about
spacetime symmetries according to which the set of dynamical symmetries
ought to coincide with the invariance group of a set of objects that we have
(for some reason or none) decided to single out as ‘special’. We then noted
(section 3) that, on this way of thinking, a PT theorem seems to be an
assertion that, subject to apparently innocuous auxiliary constraints, there
is no theory that makes essential use of a temporal orientation, over and
above a Lorentzian metric and a total orientation, and that this is puzzling.
To ground the discussion, we then recalled (in section 4) an example of such a
theorem, for the case of classical field theory. We now seek a more enlightened
point of view: a point of view from which the existence of such theorems in
certain cases is not puzzling at all, but is, rather, precisely to be expected,
where and only where they in fact occur.
My suggestion is that the following observation lies at the heart of the oth-
erwise puzzling nature of the CPT theorem: there is no tensor field that rep-
resents temporal orientation and no more, in the context of a flat Lorentzian
metric and a total orientation.
The remainder of this section has two aims. The first is to explicate this
observation—what exactly it means, and why it is true. The second is to
explain how this helps to dissolve the puzzle. It will be easiest to tackle both
of these aims simultaneously.
Intuitively, a temporal orientation on a (temporally orientable8) manifold
M is supposed to specify which temporal direction is ‘the future’. Let p be an
arbitrary point in a temporally orientable manifold M that is equipped with
a Lorentzian metric g. Then, the tangent space TpM can be divided into
timelike, spacelike and null vectors. Further, the set of timelike vectors in
8Definition: A manifold M equipped with a Lorentzian metric g is said to be temporally
orientable iff there exists a continuous, nowhere-vanishing, timelike vector field on M .
Heuristically: iff a manifold M fails to be temporally orientable, then one can ‘parallel-
transport’ a timelike vector v at some point p ∈Maround the manifold, and return to the
point p with a vector v′ that points in the opposite temporal direction to v. In this case,
it is not possible to make any continuous global specification of which temporal direction
is ‘the future’.
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TpM has two disconnected components: these will be the ‘past’ and ‘future’
lobes of the lightcone at p (‘will be’ rather than ‘are’, because until and unless
we have a temporal orientation, neither lobe is distinguished as the ‘future’
one).
Now, we wish to represent temporal orientation by some geometric object
on M . Here we have a choice: there are many structures on M that would
do the trick.
(Perhaps) the most obvious way of representing temporal orientation is
by a map that assigns, to each point p ∈M , one of the two lightcone lobes in
TpM (and that does so in a continuous way, i.e. the assignments of lightcone
lobes to neighboring points must be ‘mutually consistent’). This is our first
candidate way of representing temporal orientation.
But let us now recall the use we wish to make of our pieces of spacetime
structure: we wish to formulate laws that relate other (‘dynamical’/‘matter’)
fields to them, so that, by treating the spacetime structures as ‘special’, we
can restrict the covariance groups of non-generally-covariant formulations
of our theories. We then note that, if, as seems to be usually the case,
our physical laws take the form of differential equations coupling various
geometrical objects to one another, then a ‘map from spacetime points to
lightcone lobes’ is not an object we can easily work with. The point is that
if f is such a map, the idea of a ‘differential equation for f ’ does not seem to
make sense; f , that is, is not the right sort of object to appear in differential
equations.9
This observation suggests a second possible way of representing tempo-
ral orientation. Instead of using a map from spacetime points to lightcone
lobes, we could use a continuous nonvanishing timelike vector field, ta, on
M . (We can then pick out the ‘future’-directed timelike vectors va ∈ TpM
as those that have positive ‘dot product’ gabv
ata with ta (relative to a con-
vention according to which the metric has signature (+,−,−,−) rather than
9A referee pointed out that in a theory in which discontinuous fields are allowed (for
example, a theory of a one-particle GRW wavefunction defined on spacetime), differential
equations could use this first representation of temporal orientation in requiring the deriva-
tives of the field in one temporal orientation but not the other to satisfy some equation.
Such theories are ruled out by fiat in the conditions for the theorem stated in appendix A
(it is assumed there that the fields be tensor fields—i.e., among other things, that they be
smooth). We then face the questions: is there some other proof that Lorentz-invariance
entails PT-invariance for ‘discontinuous field theories’ of this sort; if so, what prevents
theories of this sort from making use of a temporal orientation; if not, can we write down
a counterexample? These questions warrant further investigation.
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(−,+,+,+)).) This move solves the problem we faced when trying to make
use of f : ta, as a vector field, is an object of a type that we perfectly well
know how to use in differential equations. However, we have now incurred a
problem of a different sort: ta is not restricted-Lorentz invariant. That is, it
is not the case that, ∀l ∈ L↑+, l ∗ ta = ta. The point here is that ta picks out
more structure than we wanted to pick out: we wanted only to pick out a
preferred lobe of the lightcone at each point, but a vector field picks out, in
addition, a preferred timelike vector in the chosen lightcone lobe. The up-
shot of this is that when we combine our ‘temporal orientation’ ta with our
existing pieces of structure gab, abcd, we do not have a set whose invariance
group includes L↑+: rather, the most we expect is the group of translations
and rotations (if gab is flat and t
a is constant).
This observation suggests a third possible way of representing temporal
orientation: rather than a single (continuous nowhere-vanishing timelike)
vector field, we could take an equivalence class of such vector fields (where
sa ∼ ta iff gabsatb > 0). But now we are back to our original problem: an
equivalence class of vector fields, as opposed to a particular vector field, is not
the right sort of object to appear in a single partial differential equation.10
More generally: suppose we convince ourselves that the geometric objects
we can make use of, in equations that satisfy the restrictions we have laid
down, are just those that can be represented by tensor fields.11 Then, we
10Such an equivalence class of vector fields can, of course, be used to generate a set of
differential equations. Here is a non-PT-invariant theory that makes use of this idea: Take
the temporal orientation τ to be the set of all nowhere vanishing, future-directed timelike
vector fields. Let there be (besides the temporal orientation, total orientation and metric)
a single scalar field φ. Say that φ is dynamically allowed iff the following condition holds:
(Inc) There exists at least one vector field va ∈ τ such that, at every spacetime point
p ∈ R4, va∇aφ > 0.
(This theory is cooked up to say, in a restricted-Lorentz-invariant way, ‘φ increases towards
the future’, and hence not to be PT -invariant.)
This example shows that the restrictions on the dynamics that appear in the premises
of the theorem include restrictions on the ‘logical form’ of the dynamics: it’s crucial to
the theorem that the sort of existential quantification that’s going on in this example is
disallowed.
11It is not entirely clear that this is true. For example, the covariant derivative is usually
thought of as a map from tensor fields of type (n,m) to tensor fields of type (n,m + 1),
and not itself as a tensor field; and yet it can be used in PDEs. This suggests that perhaps
the present discussion must be extended to some class of geometric objects that is wider
than the class of tensor fields. However, it is also true that the covariant derivative can
22
can avail ourselves of the following mathematical fact: any tensor that is
invariant under the restricted Lorentz group is invariant under the whole
of the proper Lorentz group.12 Meanwhile, it is clear that no PT-invariant
tensor (hence, no L+-invariant tensor) can represent temporal (or spatial)
orientation.
6 Galilean-invariant field theories
We now wish to perform a sanity check on the suggestion of section 5, by
considering Galilean-invariant (as opposed to Lorentz-invariant) field theo-
ries.
The point here is that we do not have a CPT theorem for Galilean-
invariant quantum field theory (see, e.g., (Levy-Leblond, 1967)). Corre-
spondingly, the following hypothesis concerning classical Galilean-invariant
field theories is false:
Galilean PT hypothesis. If T is a classical field theory containing tensor
be represented by a tensor field (viz. the metric—since the covariant derivative operator
is uniquely determined by the metric), so perhaps not.
A second point in this vein is that I am ignoring the issue of density weight. When one
writes “tensor” rather than “tensor density of weight n”, one normally implies that the
object under discussion has density weight zero. I do not intend this implication. Density
weight is irrelevant for present purposes, since all the transformations under consideration
have determinant unity. (For an explanation of the concept of density weight, see, e.g.,
(Anderson, 1967, pp. 23–5).)
12Proof: Let Ta1,...,an be an L
↑
+-invariant tensor. Let (lT )a1,...,an be the result of acting
on T with an arbitrary Lorentz transformation l (so, (lT )a1,...,an = l
b1
a1 . . . l
bn
anTb1...bn).
Note that each component of lT is polynomial in l (in the sense that, relative to an
arbitrary coordinate system for spacetime and for each point p ∈ M , each component of
lT (p) is a polynomial in the matrix elements of l).
Let TLZ be the Zariski topology on L, and T
R
Z the Zariski topology on R. (The Zariski
topology, on a given space on which a notion of polynomial function is defined, is that
according to which the closed sets are just those that consist of the zeros of some poly-
nomial.) Recall that the closure of a set S is the smallest closed set containing S. We
claim that, in the topology TLZ , the closure of L
↑
+ is L+. (The proof of this claim forms
the bulk of the proof of the classical CPT theorem discussed in section 4.1.) But also,
any polynomial on L is continuous in the topologies TLZ , T
R
Z . Hence, if a polynomial on
L vanishes on L↑+ it must also vanish on the whole of the T
L
Z -closure of L
↑
+, namely, the
whole of L+. Applying this argument to the polynomials given by the components of the
(lT − T )(p) yields the desired result.
(Thanks to Joaquin Teruji Thomas for pointing out this proof.)
23
fields, whose dynamics are polynomial in the fields and their derivatives,
and if in addition T is invariant under the restricted Galilean group G↑+
(relative to the usual tensor representation), then T is PT-invariant.
Therefore, if our suggested explanation of the possibility of a Lorentzian PT
theorem is on the mark, it had better not be the case that the analogous
statement is also true in the Galilean case. That is, it had better not also
be true that there is no way of representing temporal orientation against
a background of Galilean spacetime structure, without ‘picking out more
structure than we want’. That is, in this case, the object that represents
temporal orientation had better be invariant under the restricted Galilean
group.
At first sight, things look worrying. One of the points we met in the
Lorentzian case was that a vector field picked out a timelike direction, as
well as a privileged direction of time. But privileged timelike directions are
no more acceptable in the Galilean than in the Lorentzian setting.
Fortunately for our suggested explanation, however, it does not, in fact,
also go through in the Galilean case. There is no Galilean-invariant vector
field, but there is a Galilean-invariant one-form (corresponding to the fact
that, in Galilean spacetime, there is no preferred timelike direction, but there
is a priveleged notion of simultaneity). In this section we explain this point,
and we use it to develop a counterexample to the Galilean PT hypothesis.
6.1 Temporal orientation in Galilean spacetime
One encodes the structure of Minkowski spacetime using a flat Lorentzian
metric g; elements of the (full) Lorentz group are then transformations leav-
ing g invariant. Things are less simple in the Galilean case: there is no ‘single
geometric object’ that will encode, in a single shot, all of the structure of
Galilean spacetime.
Let us first get clear about what the structure is that we are trying to
encode, over and above topological and differential structure. To model the
Galilean case, we want our spacetime to possess a natural foliation into a
family of three-dimensional hypersurfaces, the preferred simultaneity slices.
We want each simultaneity slice to be equipped with a Euclidean spatial
metric. We want there to be a fact, for any two points of spacetime, about
what is the (absolute value of the) temporal distance between them. And
we want there to be a fact, for any timelike curve, about whether or not
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it is ‘straight’ (i.e. is an inertial trajectory). Iff we want to endow our
Galilean spacetime with a temporal orientation, then we also want there to
be a privileged total ordering on the set of simultaneity slices.
One way of encoding the aspects of this structure, aside from temporal
metric and temporal orientation, is as follows (here I largely follow Friedman
(1983, pp. 71–92), who sets this approach out in far more detail). We start,
as in the Lorentzian case, with a four-dimensional differentiable manifold M .
The affine structure (i.e. the set of facts about which lines in the spacetime
are ‘straight’) is encoded by a connection Γ. The Euclidean spatial metrics
are encoded by a rank 2 tensor field hab.
We now face the question of how to encode the temporal metric and/or
temporal orientation. Suppose first that we wish to encode temporal metric
without picking out a preferred temporal orientation. This can be done by
means of a symmetric tensor field of type (0, 2) (satisfying certain restric-
tions; cf. Earman (1989, pp. 30–1); in Earman’s notation, the tensor field in
question is hij). This object will tell us the temporal distance between any
two time-slices, but will not tell us which is to the future of which. Second,
though, suppose that we do wish to encode a temporal orientation, in ad-
dition to a temporal metric. Then, we can use a one-form, ta (this can be
thought of as the exterior derivative, ta := (dt)a, of a global time function
t that respects the simultaneity structure in the sense that the surfaces of
constant t are the simultaneity surfaces). This represents temporal metric
and temporal orientation at once, in the natural way: if va is a timelike vec-
tor, then |tava| is the temporal length of that vector, and the sign of tava
tells us whether va is future- or past-directed. And ta can be chosen to be
invariant under the restricted Galilean group G↑+, so we have not picked out
more structure than we wished to encode.
6.2 Counterexample to the Galilean PT hypothesis
The above suggestion for encoding temporal orientation in Galilean space-
time, via the one-form ta, can easily be used to generate a counterexample
to the ‘Galilean PT hypothesis’ above.
Here is one such counterexample: Suppose we have a theory containing
a scalar field φ and vector field va, whose dynamics are given in generally
covariant form by single equation
tav
a = habφ;a;b. (18)
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Here, ta, h
ab are understood as, respectively, the temporal structure and
Euclidean spatial metric structure outlined above for Galilean spacetime.
Suppose now that we treat ta and h
ab, and in addition the flat connection
Γ, as ‘special’. Then, we have a privileged class of coordinate systems: the
inertial frames in which t increases towards the future. In these coordinate
systems, the dynamics is given by the non-generally-covariant equation
v0 = ∇2φ. (19)
Under a restricted Galilean transformation, both v0 and ∇2φ are invari-
ant. However, under PT, ∇2φ is invariant while v0 flips sign. Hence, PT in
general does not take solutions to solutions, while restricted Galilean trans-
formations do. So this theory constitutes a counterexample to the Galilean
PT hypothesis.
This completes our ‘sanity check’: there is no Galilean CPT theorem and,
as we therefore hoped, the explanation of the CPT theorem that we offered
in the Lorentzian case does not go through in the Galilean case.
7 Conclusions
The existence of a PT theorem (such as that discussed in this paper) is prima
facie puzzling, since it seems to show that a reasonable theory cannot make
use of a temporal orientation, over and above a flat Lorentzian metric and
total orientation, without also using extra, ‘unwanted’ structure such as a
preferred frame. One might well wonder where this discrimination against
temporal orientations comes from. This paper has suggested that temporal
orientation in a relativistic context indeed is special, as pieces of spacetime
structure go: unlike the metric and total orientation, temporal orientation
cannot be represented by a tensor field. Meanwhile, we seem to be committed
to constraining principles on our physical theories (for example, constraints
on the types of PDEs theories may use), such that structure that cannot
be encoded via tensor fields (or ‘similar’) cannot essentially be used. This
dissolves the puzzle.
The discussion above was carried out in the classical context, using a ‘clas-
sical PT theorem’. However, the hope is that the same sort of line of thought
can be used to illuminate the CPT theorem in quantum field theory. The
idea underwriting this hope is that, from the point of view of classical field
theory (as opposed to particle phenomenology), the operation usually called
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‘CPT’ is in fact more naturally regarded as a PT-reversing operation, so that
the ‘CPT’ theorem is also, properly understood, a PT theorem; furthermore,
we hope that precisely analogous proofs can be given for the classical- and
quantum-theoretic PT theorems. (Both these suggestions are also made by
Bell (1955).) One then wonders whether similar lines of thought can also
illuminate the relationship between parity violation and ‘CP’ violation, the
possibility of CPT violation, and so on.
Several open questions remain. The most pressing is perhaps the follow-
ing. We have restricted attention thus far to tensor field theories. But this is
not, of course, the most general type of field theory of physical interest, or for
which we have (quantum-mechanically) a CPT theorem. In particular, the
above treatment has said nothing about spinor field theories. In fact, pre-
liminary investigation suggests that the case of spinors is rather complicated:
one can construct a Lorentz-invariant temporal orientation in a spinor field
theory (see, e.g., (Wald, 1984, p. 352)); thus, according to the argument of
this paper, one should expect to be able to formulate a Lorentz-invariant, but
PT-violating, spinorial field theory; if the spinor fields are taken to commute
then indeed one can; but, mysteriously (from the geometrical point of view),
requiring spinors to anticommute blocks the counterexamples. The further
investigation of these matters is a future project.
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A Classical PT theorem
A more rigorous statement of the theorem referred to in section 4.1 follows.
A proof is given in (Greaves, n.d.).
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Theorem 1 (Classical PT theorem for polynomial systems of real tensor
fields.). Let M be a differentiable manifold that is diffeomorphic to R4.
Let Φ be a space of n-tuples of tensor fields of specified types on M . That
is, suppose there is a fixed set of integers ni,mi : i = 1, . . . , n such that each
φ ∈ Φ is an n-tuple of the form (φ1, . . . , φn), where, for each i, φi is a tensor
field of type (ni,mi).
Let η be a flat Lorentzian metric on M . Let L be the group of manifold
diffeomorphisms l : M → M leaving η invariant (i.e., L is the Lorentz
group). Let L↑+, L
↓
−, L
↑
−, L
↓
+ be the connected subsets of L that reverse neither
time sense nor parity, time sense but not parity, parity but not time sense,
and both time sense and parity respectively. For arbitrary l ∈ L and φ ∈ Φ,
let lφ be the n-tuple of fields obtained by allowing l to act in the natural way
on each element of φ.
Let F : Φ→ RM be a functional that is polynomial in the fields and their
derivatives. That is, suppose there exists a chart x : M → R4, non-negative
integers p, q and real coefficients {am1,...,mn ∈ R : m1, . . . ,mn = 0, . . . , p}
such that for all φ ∈ Φ,
F (φ) =
p∑
m1,...,mn=0
am1,...,mq(ψ1)
m1(ψ2)
m2 . . . (ψq)
mq , (20)
where each ψj is a specified partial coordinate derivative (possibly zeroth or-
der) of a specified one of the coordinate components (φi)
µ1...µni ν1...νmi
, and
multiplication is defined pointwise in the obvious way.
Let S ⊆ Φ be given by
S := {φ ∈ Φ : F (φ) = 0} (21)
[the intended interpretation being that S is the set of solutions to the partial
differential equation expressed by the condition F = 0].
Suppose that S is invariant under L↑+, i.e. for any φ ∈ S and l ∈ L↑+,
lφ ∈ S also. Then, S is invariant under all of L+.
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